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THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:  
THE FIRST 125 YEARS 
Kenneth A. Plevan* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no question that the Second Circuit has had a significant 
influence on the development of U.S. intellectual property law, especially 
copyright law, and the reasons are evident.  Historically, many of the 
business segments for which intellectual property rights were key assets, or 
at the heart of the endeavor, were concentrated in the New York area, 
including television, music, advertising, publishing, and theater. 
Regardless of the reasons, it is inarguable that the Second Circuit has had 
a profound impact on copyright law.  Judge Learned Hand’s decision in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.1 helped define for later generations the 
fundamental idea/expression dichotomy.  The transformative use doctrine, 
which dates from a 1990 influential article by then-District Judge Pierre N. 
Leval,2 has not been without its critics, but its continued importance has 
been reaffirmed in the court’s 2015 decision in Author’s Guild v. Google, 
Inc.3 (Google Books).  Other leading decisions have helped write the rules 
of the road for the e-commerce era, both in the copyright and trademark 
contexts.  For trademarks, the Second Circuit was the first federal circuit to 
craft a multifactor test for likelihood of confusion,4 an approach adopted in 
time by all circuits.  In another universally followed decision, the court set 
forth the standards for the degrees of mark distinctiveness.5  In the Lanham 
Act advertising area, Second Circuit decisions helped define the role of 
survey evidence in determining whether and when advertising messages 
 
*  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; Harvard College, 1966; Harvard Law 
School, 1969; member of the New York Bar.  The author acknowledges with great 
appreciation the invaluable contributions by the following attorneys:  the author’s colleague 
Douglas Nemec was principally responsible for the section discussing patent cases, which 
incorporated suggestions from the author’s former colleague David Hansen; Richard Dannay 
and J. Christopher Jensen of the law firm of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman offered guidance 
on the selection of copyright cases and offered helpful comments on the draft; the author’s 
former colleague Xiyin Tang, now at Mayer Brown LLP, and colleague David Lamb 
contributed greatly to all aspects of this Article. 
 
 1. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 2. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
 3. 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 4. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs., Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 5. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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that might be considered literally truthful are nevertheless actionable as 
impliedly false.6  One leading Second Circuit case was the first to recognize 
a right of publicity,7 and another continues to guide the direction of this 
important intellectual property doctrine today.8 
In addition to the traditional categories of copyright, patent, and 
trademark law, intellectual property law encompasses a range of distinct 
substantive areas.  For example, the right of publicity, albeit a creation of 
state statutory law, is generally considered an area of intellectual property 
and is covered in this article.  Law school catalogs9 usually include trade 
secret law within the purview of intellectual property, but because trade 
secret issues often arise in employment disputes, this subject has not been 
included.10 
I.  COPYRIGHT LAW 
For many years, leading Second Circuit decisions have helped define and 
invigorate all principal aspects of copyright law.  Based on a quantitative 
analysis of published copyright decisions cross-referenced to decisions 
discussed in copyright case books, Professor William Ford observed in 
2006 that “[o]verall, the Second Circuit is the clear leader in terms of 
experience and influence.”11  The article concluded that “the Second and 
Ninth Circuits, along with the Supreme Court and the Southern District of 
New York, are the most influential courts in the development of copyright 
law.”12 
Similarly, an article published in the 1991 St. John’s Law Review pointed 
out that several Second Circuit judges testified in 1990 at joint 
congressional hearings on the issue of copyright fair use.13  The author 
observed that, as of that time, 
[t]he Second Circuit is widely recognized as the nation’s most important 
copyright court.  Centered in the capital city of publishing and the arts, 
and mindful of the proud tradition of copyright scholars who have formed 
 
 6. See Am. Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 7. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 8. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 9. The information about law school classes was obtained from the course lists of four 
law schools. See Class Schedules and Registration, U. CHI. L. SCH., https:// 
classes.uchicago.edu (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/P7KH-7E5X]; Course 
Catalog, HARV. L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/ (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4X7C-MDU8]; Course Catalog, STAN. L. SCH., https:// 
www.law.stanford.edu/courses (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/M29L-CARQ]; 
Course Descriptions, NYU SCH. L., https://its.law.nyu.edu/courses/ (last visited Sept. 6, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/XF89-8YP8]. 
 10. More recently, cyberlaw and digital privacy have become common subjects of law 
school classes falling within the catalog definition of intellectual property, but these are 
subjects of too recent origin to warrant inclusion. 
 11. William K. Ford, Judging Experience in Copyright Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41 
(2006). 
 12. Id. at 41–42. 
 13. James H. Carter, They Know It When They See It:  Copyright and Aesthetics in the 
Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 773, 773 n.1 (1991). 
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its treasure of precedent, the court regularly hears appeals raising issues in 
the forefront of copyright developments.14 
Professor David Nimmer, a widely known copyright scholar, has referred to 
the Second Circuit as the “Copyright Specialists.”15 
This part starts with Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,16 a decision by 
Judge Learned Hand widely cited in academic circles as one of the leading 
cases in U.S. copyright history.  Addressing the fundamental issue of the 
ideal/expression dichotomy, Nichols helped frame the fundamental scope of 
copyright protection.  Other leading Second Circuit decisions have set 
standards for copyrighting computer software, developed principles 
applicable in the protection of the online marketplace, and established the 
highly influential principle of transformative use as an essential element of 
a fair use analysis. 
A.  Standards for Determining Copyright Infringement 
The discussion begins, appropriately, with the all-important 
idea/expression dichotomy, then addresses the use of experts in copyright 
infringement analyses and copyright standards for computer software. 
1.  The Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
Nichols is one of the earliest decisions from the Second Circuit to discuss 
the copyright concepts underlying the fundamental doctrines of the 
idea/expression dichotomy and scenes à faire.  The appeal was heard by 
Judges Learned Hand, Thomas W. Swan, and Augustus N. Hand, with the 
opinion written by Judge Learned Hand. 
The plaintiff, Anne Nichols, was a playwright who had achieved great 
success with her first Broadway play Abie’s Irish Rose (the subject of the 
lawsuit).17  The primary defendant was Universal Pictures Corporation 
(now known as Universal Studios), the film studio that had produced a 
motion picture entitled The Cohens and Kellys.18  Both plot lines dealt with 
marriage between young adults from families of different religions 
(Catholic and Jewish) and the comedic consequences of such unions.19 
Abie’s Irish Rose became a commercial hit and went on to become, at 
that time, the longest running Broadway production ever (a distinction it 
held for fourteen years).20  Similarly, The Cohens and Kellys enjoyed 
 
 14. Id. at 773. 
 15. See David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003). 
 16. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 17. Id. at 120. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 120–21. 
 20. See Paul Mrozka, Broadway Long Runs:  How New York Became Home to the Long 
Run, BROADWAY SCENE (May 17, 2013), http://broadwayscene.com/broadway-long-runs-
how-new-york-became-home-to-the-long-run/ [https://perma.cc/943C-N4BZ].  Indeed, the 
show’s touring company held the record for the longest running touring company for nearly 
forty years. See Abie’s Irish Rose, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title= 
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significant commercial success and spawned five sequels between 1928 and 
1933.21  These two works appear to have captured the spirit of America as 
an ethnic melting pot.  As the decision pointed out, the basic themes and 
characters presented in the two works were, in that era, the subject of 
numerous plays, books, films, and radio programs.22 
Plaintiff’s copyright infringement lawsuit sought an injunction and an 
accounting of profits.23  In ruling for the defendants, the district court had 
held that although there were clear similarities between the two works, and 
clear evidence that defendants copied certain aspects of the plaintiff’s play, 
nothing that the defendants took from the plaintiff’s work was 
copyrightable.24  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, 
holding that whatever features defendants may have taken from Abie’s Irish 
Rose were not copyrightable elements but were instead general and 
unprotected concepts.25 
The court began with a detailed description of the general plot and story 
elements of each work.26  It then explained that while copyright must 
protect literary works beyond direct copying, at some point of abstraction 
the line is crossed between a protectable expression of an idea and the basic 
idea itself, which is not protected by copyright.27  This discussion presents 
one of the earliest and clearest descriptions in copyright law of the now-
familiar idea/expression dichotomy. 
The court ultimately found that the similarities between the two works—
including feuding Irish and Jewish families, young lovers secretly marrying, 
and ultimate reconciliation—exemplified only general ideas that could not 
be protected by copyright.28  On the issue as to whether the plaintiff’s 
characters were copyrightable, and to what extent (if any) the defendants’ 
comparable characters constituted infringement, the court concluded that, 
for the most part, in both works the characters were little more than stock 
figures, demonstrating common and well-known characteristics that were 
not original to either party.29  This discussion reflected an early depiction of 
what is now known as the scènes-à-faire doctrine. 
 
Abie%27s_Irish_Rose&oldid=729973360 (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) [https://perma.cc/UY7 
7-N5QN]. 
 21. THE COHENS AND THE KELLYS IN PARIS (Universal Pictures 1928); THE COHENS AND 
KELLYS IN ATLANTIC CITY (Universal Pictures 1929); THE COHENS AND THE KELLYS IN SCOTLAND 
(Universal Pictures 1930); THE COHENS AND THE KELLYS IN AFRICA (Universal Pictures 1930); 
THE COHENS AND KELLYS IN TROUBLE (Universal Pictures 1933). 
 22. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121–22. 
 23. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff’d, 45 
F.2d 119. 
 24. Id. at 148. 
 25. See generally Nichols, 45 F.2d 119. 
 26. See id. at 120–21. 
 27. See id. at 121. 
 28. See id. at 121–23. 
 29. See id. at 122. 
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The Nichols decision has been cited over 325 times by state, federal, and 
even foreign courts, and in over 1,100 secondary sources.30  It is also 
widely admired among both scholars and practitioners for the poetic quality 
of language describing and explaining important legal principles.  For 
example, in summing up one of the fundamental components of copyright 
protection, Judge Hand stated, in frequently quoted language, that “[i]t is of 
course essential to any protection of literary property . . . that the right 
cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by 
immaterial variations.”31  In explaining the foundation for the “abstraction” 
test, Judge Hand noted that 
“[u]pon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality 
will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out . . . but 
there is a point in this series of abstractions where [the concepts] are no 
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of 
his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression, his property is never 
extended.”32 
And, in discussing the idea/expression dichotomy, the opinion aptly 
observed that “[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and 
nobody ever can.”33 
One notable aspect of Nichols is that the panel appeared to be wholly 
uninfluenced by what could be fairly characterized as bad facts.  The record 
in the district court showed that the defendants originally attempted to 
purchase motion picture rights to Abie’s Irish Rose, that the screenwriters 
for The Cohens and Kellys studied a synopsis of Abie’s Irish Rose while 
writing The Cohens and Kellys, and that when the film was being released, 
Universal Pictures proudly proclaimed that it would “be to the screen what 
‘Abie’s Irish Rose’ is to the stage.”34  The Second Circuit panel was not 
distracted by the intent evidence from the application and development of 
important copyright legal principles. 
2.  Continued Influence of Nichols 
The importance of Nichols can be seen not only in how often it has been 
cited, but also in the types of cases it has influenced.  For instance, the 
Second Circuit relied on Nichols in its decision in Williams v. Crichton.35  
Similar to Nichols, Williams involved accusations that a popular novel-
turned-film infringed the copyright of an earlier work—in Williams a series 
of children’s books.36 
Plaintiff in Williams filed a lawsuit against several individuals and 
companies connected to the Jurassic Park film and novel, including both 
 
 30. This figure comes from the “Citing References” tab of the Nichols case on Westlaw 
Next. 
 31. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). 
 35. 84 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 36. See id. at 581. 
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Steven Spielberg and Michael Crichton.37  The plaintiff had written a series 
of children’s books about a dinosaur zoo and claimed that the Jurassic Park 
works appropriated protected elements from his stories.38  Relying on 
Nichols and its progeny, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge James 
L. Oakes, held that the only similarities between the plaintiff’s stories and 
the Jurassic Park film and novel were scènes-à-faire elements that were 
necessarily inherent in the idea of a dinosaur zoo.39  Williams is also 
notable for declaring that the test for substantial similarity and copyright 
infringement is the same for works intended for child audiences as those for 
adult audiences.40 
3.  Role for Experts in Copyright Disputes 
Another Second Circuit bedrock case on resolving copyright 
infringement issues is Arnstein v. Porter,41 which involved accusations of 
copyright infringement for musical compositions.42  The district court had 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that no issue 
of material fact remained after reviewing the depositions of both parties and 
listening to recordings of the musical pieces at issue.43 
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Jerome N. Frank, principally 
considered two important issues:  (1) the appropriate role of experts in 
copyright infringement cases and (2) what questions should be left for the 
finder of fact to resolve.44  On the first issue, the court divided its analysis 
into the two elements necessary to maintain a copyright infringement 
action:  (1) whether there had been copying and (2) whether the copying 
constituted infringing appropriation.45  Because evidence of direct copying 
(or a defendant admitting that he or she copied a work) was likely to be 
unavailable, the court permitted expert testimony on the issue of striking 
similarity, so that a plaintiff more easily could establish that a defendant 
likely copied at least a portion of the copyrighted work.46 
At the same time, the court rejected the position that expert testimony 
was permissible on the second prong of copyright infringement, i.e., the 
question of whether the defendant’s copying amounted to impermissible 
infringement.47  Here, the court held that to establish infringement, a 
plaintiff would need to show that the pieces are so similar to a lay listener 
as to be “inexcusably alike.”48  Therefore, expert testimony on the issue of 
 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 582. 
 39. See id. at 587–89. 
 40. See id. at 589. 
 41. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 42. See id. at 467. 
 43. Arnstein v. Porter, No. 29-754, 1945 WL 6897, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1945), 
rev’d, 154 F.2d 464. 
 44. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468–69. 
 45. See id. at 468. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. at 473. 
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impermissible copying (as distinct from whether copying occurred as a 
factual matter) was extremely limited and only allowed where the experts 
were testifying on the issue of the lay reaction to the works.49 
Arnstein has been cited almost 600 times in judicial decisions and more 
than 750 times in secondary authorities.  On the expert issue, Arnstein 
followed up on dicta from Nichols, where Judge Learned Hand had ended 
the decision by lamenting the use of experts in that case as well, expressing 
the hope that expert testimony on the issue of infringement would be 
excluded entirely in the future.50  While the use of experts on the issue of 
substantial similarity is rare today, it is generally considered proper in two 
areas:  (1) music cases and (2) software cases.51 
The principles set forth in Arnstein are still valid today, but many 
copyright claims are nevertheless rejected on summary judgment.52  
Copyright infringement claims also have been defeated on a motion to 
dismiss,53 which is not surprising since the complaint must cite the 
copyrighted work and the alleged infringing work,54 thereby putting both 
works before the district court on a motion challenging the legal sufficiency 
of the pleading. 
4.  Copyright and Computer Software 
Computer software presents challenging copyright law issues, as the 
courts attempt to strike a balance between rewarding programmers with 
sufficient copyright protection and encouraging innovation in the software 
field.  A principal analytical framework for determining the scope of 
copyright protection afforded to computer software is the three-part 
“abstraction-filtration-comparison” test formulated in Computer Associates 
International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.55 
The dispute in Altai arose out of two functionally similar computer 
programs developed by different companies.56  Greatly simplifying the 
facts, Computer Associates (CA) developed ADAPTER, a successful 
“operating system compatibility” program that allowed its job scheduling 
program, CA-SCHEDULER, to function on different operating systems.57  
The defendant, Altai, developed its own compatibility software, OSCAR 
 
 49. See id. 
 50. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 51. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.10[c] 
(rev. ed. 2015). 
 52. See, e.g., Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(discussing architectural designs). 
 53. See, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
 54. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 51, § 12.09. 
 55. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 56. See id. at 698–700. 
 57. See id. at 698–99. 
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3.5, which performed in a similar fashion.58  CA contended that OSCAR 
3.5 infringed its copyright in ADAPTER.59 
Altai prevailed in the district court, with the court concluding that 
because ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5 were only similar in their user-facing 
behavior rather than in their coding, the two programs were not 
substantially similar in form.60  CA appealed, arguing that the district court 
erred by failing to find copyright protection for the nonliteral, structural 
elements of ADAPTER, such as its general flow charts, intermodular 
relationships, parameter lists, and macros.61 
In an opinion written by Judge John M. Walker, the Second Circuit 
compared and contrasted computer software to other types of copyright 
protected works.62  At the outset, the court noted that copyright protection 
generally extends beyond a literary work’s textual form to nonliteral 
elements of expression.63  However, the court cautioned that the utility of 
software makes more difficult the task of distinguishing protectable, 
nonliteral expression and nonprotectable, general ideas.64  In their entirety, 
computer programs are more than singular ideas—software is made up of 
subprograms, each embodying a discrete idea and organized in a specific 
form.  But these component parts coalesce into a process, a nonliteral 
element arguably beyond the bounds of copyright protection. 
To balance these competing interests, the Second Circuit panel borrowed 
from well-established copyright doctrines to fashion the “abstraction-
filtration-comparison” test.65  In the “abstraction” prong, the court parsed 
the software into its component parts.66  Using the abstraction test 
articulated by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols as a guide, the court divided 
OSCAR 3.5 into four parts:  source and object code, parameter lists, 
services required, and outlines.67 
After the constituent parts were identified, the test proceeded to the 
“filtration” prong, which requires the removal of all nonprotected 
component parts.68  An element is nonprotectable if it is in the public 
domain or if it is an idea, rather than an expression of an idea.69  An 
example of an unprotected idea within software is the link set in the desktop 
taskbar.  Linked options such as “File,” “Edit,” and “View” are examples of 
expression dictated by efficiency rather than creativity.  In short, the taskbar 
“idea” is so closely linked to its expression and so vital as a building block 
 
 58. See id. at 700. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 554, 560–62 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
 61. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 701–02. 
 62. See id. at 702–12. 
 63. See id. at 701. 
 64. See id. at 702–12. 
 65. See id. at 706. 
 66. See id. at 706–07. 
 67. See Id. at 714 (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 554, 
560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 68. See id. at 707–10. 
 69. See id. at 707. 
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in future program creation that it does not warrant copyright protection.  
Thus, in Altai, the court filtered out most of ADAPTER’s component parts 
as nonprotectable because their expression was incident to the idea, a result 
of efficiency rather than creative expression.70 
After “abstraction” and “filtration,” one is left with the protectable 
expression of the software—the “golden nugget.”71  The “comparison” 
prong compares the remaining expressive elements of the plaintiff’s 
program with the allegedly infringing elements of the defendant’s 
program.72  Finding that Altai did not copy any of the protectable elements 
of ADAPTER, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district 
court.73 
The continuing influence of Altai is evident in the recent, significant 
decision in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.74  At issue in that dispute 
between two technology giants was the copyrightability of certain packages 
of source code first developed by Oracle and used in the operating system 
of the popular Android mobile devices.75  In a comprehensive opinion, the 
Federal Circuit, citing to Altai nearly a dozen times, relied heavily on the 
“abstraction-filtration-comparison” test, pointing out that the test was first 
“formulated by the Second Circuit and expressly adopted by several other 
circuits.”76 
B.  Copyright and Fair Use:  
The Transformative Use Doctrine 
One of the most profound influences of the Second Circuit on U.S. 
copyright law is seen in the development of the transformative use doctrine.  
Often a determinative aspect of the fair use analysis, the doctrine was first 
proposed in an influential article by Second Circuit Judge Pierre N. Leval, 
then a district court judge.77 
The fair use defense generally serves to resolve the inherent tension 
between protecting intellectual property rights of artists and protecting the 
First Amendment rights of others to speak freely about, criticize, and 
comment on existing works.  The rights to copyright protection and 
freedom of expression are on equal constitutional footing, as Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to promote 
the progress of science and arts by granting creators limited monopolies 
over their works.78 
 
 70. See id. at 707–10. 
 71. See id. at 710–11. 
 72. See id. at 710. 
 73. See id. at 721. 
 74. 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 75. See id. at 1347–48. 
 76. Id. at 1357. 
 77. See Leval, supra note 2. 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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The fair use doctrine was ultimately codified in the Copyright Act of 
1976.79  Although transformative use is not referred to in the statute, and its 
development postdates its adoption, it has become an integral part of the 
fair use analysis.  A few years following the publication of Judge Leval’s 
article, the Supreme Court cited it throughout one of its most well-known 
fair use decisions, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.80  The Court 
expanded upon Judge Leval’s original conception of transformative use, 
which had been based on the first fair use factor, holding that “[t]he more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other 
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”81 
Following the Campbell decision, the Second Circuit has identified 
transformative use as the primary issue to be considered when determining 
whether a second use satisfied the object of copyright law to stimulate 
creativity, rather than merely being a repackaging and republishing of the 
original.  One such case is Blanch v. Koons,82 where the defendant artist 
used the plaintiff’s photograph as part of a commissioned work.83  The 
photograph, depicting a woman’s feet in high-fashion sandals, with metallic 
nail polish, resting on a man’s lap in a first-class airplane cabin, had been 
published in Allure magazine accompanying a feature about metallic-
colored cosmetic products.84  The defendant used this and several other 
photographs to create a collage of four pairs of legs dangling over images of 
confections, with a grassy field and Niagara Falls in the background.85  The 
work incorporating the photograph was part of a larger exhibition, the 
purpose of which (according to the defendant) was to critique and comment 
on “consumer culture” and the consequences of society’s obsession with 
mass media.86 
In the opinion in Blanch, authored by Judge Robert D. Sack, the court 
focused on the vastly different purposes of the two works, as well as the 
intent of the defendant’s use of the photograph as a means of expressing 
comment and criticism, in finding that the defendant’s work was 
sufficiently transformative to constitute a fair use.87  The court held that the 
defendant’s purpose and use of the work (i.e., as part of a large art 
exhibition critiquing aspects of society) were entirely different from those 
of the plaintiff (i.e., as part of a lifestyle magazine supporting and glorifying 
those same aspects of society and culture).88 
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,89 decided four months 
before Blanch, involved a 480-page coffee table book cataloging the career 
 
 79. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012). 
 80. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 81. Id. at 579. 
 82. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 83. Id. at 246. 
 84. See id. at 247–48. 
 85. See id. at 248. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. at 251–53. 
 88. See id. at 252–53. 
 89. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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and cultural impact of the band The Grateful Dead.90  The book had a 
timeline running continuously throughout, which told the band’s history 
chronologically and included several images that complemented and 
provided visuals for the text.91  Of the over 2,000 images included in the 
book, seven were of works copyrighted by the plaintiff (six were images of 
concert posters and one was an image of concert tickets).92 
In an opinion authored by Judge Jane A. Restani (then-Chief Judge of the 
U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation), the Second 
Circuit panel upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
dismissing the claim, relying heavily on the transformative nature of the 
defendant’s use of the works in question.93  The court held that the 
defendant’s use of “thumbnail” reproductions of the plaintiff’s protected 
works was sufficiently transformative to constitute a fair use.94  The court 
contrasted the plaintiff’s original use of the works as a means for providing 
the public with general concert information and promoting the band through 
artistic expression with the defendant’s use of the works as a tool to 
enhance the readers’ understanding of the biographical and historical text in 
the book.95 
Bill Graham Archives and Blanch illustrate two aspects of the 
transformative use doctrine.  It can apply either (1) where the original work 
has been transformed in some significant way to make a statement (as in 
Blanch) or (2) where the original work remains unchanged, but is used in an 
entirely different context, thereby transforming the purpose and meaning of 
the work (as in Bill Graham Archives). 
Transformative use is not without its limits.  For instance, in Salinger v. 
Colting,96 in an opinion by Judge Guido Calabresi, the court concluded that 
an unauthorized sequel to J.D. Salinger’s classic novel The Catcher in the 
Rye was not sufficiently transformative to qualify as a fair use.97  Despite 
the defendant’s arguments that his intent in writing the sequel, entitled 60 
Years Later:  Coming Through the Rye, was in part to parody and comment 
on Salinger himself (who appears as a minor character in the novel), the 
court held that the work was primarily nontransformative as a straight 
sequel to Catcher in the Rye.98 
There is no question that the transformative use doctrine has had a 
significant impact on copyright jurisprudence.99  Judge Leval’s article itself 
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 93. See id. at 608–12, 615. 
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 96. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 97. See id. at 83–84. 
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has been cited over 900 times.100  A recent decision in the Seventh Circuit 
questioning the doctrine is discussed in the next section.101 
C.  Transformative Use in the Digital Age:  
The Google Books Decision 
In the fourth quarter of 2015, the Second Circuit handed down its latest 
landmark copyright decision in Authors Guild v. Google Inc.,102 a decade-
old litigation referred to informally as “Google Books.”  There, the Second 
Circuit reaffirmed the central role that transformative use plays in the fair 
use analysis.  The complaint in Google Books challenged two projects 
undertaken by technology giant Google, Inc.—the Google Library Project 
and the Google Books Project.103  Through these two projects, Google 
made unauthorized digital copies of tens of millions of books that had been 
submitted by major libraries for that purpose.104  Google then used the 
digital scans to establish a publicly available free search engine whereby 
users could determine whether certain books contained a specified word or 
term, as well as review “snippets” of text showing the context of the use.105  
Google also allowed the participating libraries to download and retain 
digital copies of the books that they had submitted, provided that the 
libraries committed to not using the digital copies in violation of copyright 
law.106 
In September 2005, authors and a membership organization to which 
they belonged filed a copyright infringement lawsuit on behalf of 
themselves and a putative class of impacted authors.107  After extensive 
negotiations, the parties proposed a class-wide settlement, which Judge 
Denny Chin rejected as unfair, inadequate, and unreasonable.108 
The plaintiffs subsequently filed for class certification, and Google 
countered with a motion to dismiss.109  In May 2012, the district court 
denied Google’s motion to dismiss and granted the individual plaintiffs’ 
motion for class certification.110  On appeal, however, the Second Circuit 
set aside the grant of class certification, noting that the resolution of 
Google’s fair use defense could potentially moot many of the class 
certification issues, and therefore that question should be decided first.111 
On the parties’ subsequent cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge 
Chin (who had in the interim been appointed to the Second Circuit but 
 
 100. This figure comes from the “Citing References” tab for the article on Westlaw Next, 
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 101. See infra Part I.C. 
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 107. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 108. Id. at 686. 
 109. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 110. See id. at 395. 
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elected to retain the case) held that Google’s copying constituted fair use.112  
On the authors’ appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment, focusing on the transformative nature of the Google 
Book and Library projects.113 
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Leval, the author of the 1990 
seminal law review article introducing the concept of transformative use to 
copyright law discussed above,114 relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,115 as well as leading fair 
use cases from other circuits, including A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. 
iParadigms, LLC,116 and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.117  Focusing 
on the purpose and character of the Google Books Project as a tool for users 
to determine what books contain the information they are seeking, the court 
noted that the purpose of Google’s copying was to “make available 
significant information about those books,” and that such activity was “a 
quintessentially transformative use . . . [as] the result of a word search is 
different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, and message from the 
page (and the book) from which it is drawn.”118 
In so ruling, the court was careful to note that while the copying at the 
center of these projects was clearly covered by fair use, other aspects of the 
projects, particularly the “snippet” display and the use of the digital copies 
by the libraries, were fair specifically based on the record before it.119  
Thus, in a “copyright dispute [which] tests the boundaries of fair use,”120 
the court limited key parts of its holding to the facts before it and declined 
to comment on whether some other use of the digital copies by Google or 
the libraries would also be considered sufficiently transformative to be 
fair.121 
The court in Google Books addressed the importance of the 
transformative character of Google’s use in evaluating each of the four 
statutory factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.122 
 
 112. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
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 116. 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 117. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); see Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 212–23. 
 118. See Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 217 (quoting Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 
F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
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For instance, even though Google copied the entirety of the authors’ works, 
which typically would counsel against a fair use finding under factor three 
(the amount and substantiality of the portion copied), the court noted that 
the extent of permissible copying is directly related to the purpose of the 
work.123  Because Google’s purpose was to provide information about the 
books, including how many times a particular word or phrase was used in 
those books, the court found that copying the entirety of the work was the 
only way to accomplish this purpose.124  Similarly, under the fourth factor 
(the effect of the use on the potential market), the court held that because 
Google’s copying served an entirely different purpose than the original 
works, there was little risk that the market for the original works would be 
impacted.125 
Several courts outside of the Second Circuit had recently questioned the 
usefulness of the transformative use concept.  Most significantly, in Kienitz 
v. Sconnie Nation LLC,126 a Seventh Circuit panel rejected the application 
of the doctrine (while still upholding the fair use defense), noting that it is 
not included in the statutory fair use factors and asserting that its 
application runs the risk of eliminating copyright holders’ exclusive right to 
produce derivative works.127  In particular, the panel noted its disagreement 
with another recent Second Circuit decision, Cariou v. Prince,128 which had 
held that a transformative use did not need to comment on the original 
work.129 
In a footnote in the Google Books opinion, and in other parts of its 
analysis as well, the panel responded to the Seventh Circuit’s position, 
positing that the concerns identified by the Seventh Circuit could be 
avoided if courts refrained from broad interpretations of the term 
“transformative” and instead focused on the jurisprudence inherent in the 
concept.130  Judge Leval offered that the transformative use principle serves 
as a helpful guidepost for addressing a difficult and complex topic and that 
the four-factor test in the statute was never meant to be exclusive, but rather 
it was meant to be a framework for the courts to use in developing and 
applying the fair use doctrine on a case-by-case basis.131 
Because Google Books was not decided on a class-wide basis, it is 
theoretically possible for another group of authors to assert similar claims 
against Google in another circuit.  Notwithstanding the disagreement 
between the Seventh and Second Circuits over Cariou and the application 
of the transformative use doctrine, it seems unlikely the Seventh Circuit (or 
panels from any other circuit) would take issue with the outcome in Google 
Books.  Moreover, as the district court decision in Google Books was 
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authored by Judge Chin, the opinion actually represents the unanimous 
view of four Second Circuit judges.  Thus, Google Books should secure the 
role of the transformative use analysis in copyright jurisprudence for the 
foreseeable future. 
D.  Responsibilities of Online Service Providers 
to Eliminate Infringement 
In 2012, the Second Circuit interpreted key provisions of the 1998 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) protecting online service 
providers from copyright infringement liability.  In Viacom International, 
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,132 in an influential opinion written by Judge José A. 
Cabranes, the court held that for there to be secondary liability, service 
providers must have knowledge or awareness of specific and identifiable 
instances of infringement on their websites.  But the court also held that 
service providers could not avoid such knowledge (and liability) by means 
of “willful blindness.”133  The court also held that the DMCA requires a 
high standard of control for vicarious liability, encompassing only those 
providers that are closely involved with their users’ activities.134  The 
court’s decision is likely to have a lasting impact on the policies and 
practices of copyright owners and service providers alike. 
Viacom filed suit against YouTube in 2007, “alleging direct and 
secondary copyright infringement based on the public performance, display, 
and reproduction of their audiovisual works on the YouTube website.”135  
At the same time, the Premier League, an English soccer association, also 
filed a putative class action against YouTube for copyright infringement, 
and the cases were consolidated.136  This clash between well-known 
entertainment and sports entities over developing e-commerce business 
models led to an intensely watched case in the district court, which granted 
summary judgment for the defendant.137 
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal but upheld many of 
YouTube’s positions.138  The court first addressed whether 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(c)(A) requires that an online service provider have knowledge of 
specific and identifiable infringements or if general knowledge was 
sufficient to find liability.139  The court looked to the statutory language, 
which provides that in the absence of actual knowledge of infringing 
activity, an online service provider is not liable if it does not have “red flag” 
knowledge, meaning that it is “not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent.”140  The court concluded that 
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knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity was necessary to 
incur liability because expeditious removal of infringing material is possible 
only if the service provider knows precisely which items to remove.141 
The court further held that the provider could not avoid specific 
knowledge through “willful blindness.”142  On this issue, the court 
recognized that 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) does not require service provider 
monitoring of users’ activities.143  However, the statute is silent on 
“deliberate effort[s] to avoid guilty knowledge,” or willful blindness.144  
And, because the statute does not explicitly address the doctrine of willful 
blindness, it does not abrogate it.145 
The court also addressed liability based on receipt of financial benefit 
attributable to infringing activity that the service provider has the “right and 
ability to control.”146  Finding that importing a common law definition of 
vicarious liability would render the DMCA “internally inconsistent,” the 
court held that the statute “requires something more than the ability to 
remove or block access” to infringing content on the service provider’s 
website.147  Although defining the contours of that elevated standard is 
difficult, the court suggested that “exerting substantial influence” on the 
activities of users could constitute the extra element necessary to find a 
service provider liable.148 
The decision in Viacom was immediately recognized as landmark 
precedent.  Just a few months before the Second Circuit decision, the Ninth 
Circuit addressed similar questions on the limits of service provider 
protection in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC.149  
Although that court’s interpretation of the DMCA differed slightly from the 
Second Circuit’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit issued a superseding opinion in 
2013 in light of Viacom.150  Viacom has also been followed by a number of 
district courts outside the Second Circuit.151 
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for the 
defendant.152  The ultimate result may encourage media companies to offer 
reasonable licenses.  Online service providers, moreover, cannot be 
 
 141. See Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 30–32. 
 142. See id. at 34–35. 
 143. See id. at 35. 
 144. Id. (quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 36; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2012). 
 147. See Viacom Int’l, 676 F.3d at 38 (quoting Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 
821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011), superseded on reh’g, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 150. See UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d 1006; see also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding the defendant liable under the theory of 
red flag knowledge set out by the Second Circuit). 
 151. See, e.g., BWP Media USA Inc. v. Clarity Dig. Grp., LLC, No. 14-cv-00467-PAB-
KMT, 2015 WL 1538366 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1154 (10th Cir. 
Apr. 29, 2015); Square Ring, Inc. v. Doe-1, No. 09-563 (GMS), 2015 WL 307840 (D. De1. 
Jan. 23, 2015); Disney Enters, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013). 
 152. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
2016] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 159 
oblivious to infringement on their website.  Rather, to avoid the allegation 
of willful blindness, they are encouraged to implement mechanisms to 
streamline the process by which copyright owners can notify them of 
specific infringing content to expedite removal.  Thus, to minimize 
infringement in developing online business models without overly 
inhibiting that development, the Second Circuit opinion envisions a 
responsibility shared between copyright owners and service providers. 
More recently, in Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC,153 the Second 
Circuit addressed an important question of first impression regarding the 
proper interpretation of the safe harbor provision of the DMCA.  As 
discussed above, the DMCA establishes a safe harbor from liability for 
“infringement of copyright” for online service providers that lack actual or 
“red flag” knowledge of infringing uses.154  In Capitol Records, the court 
addressed, among other issues, whether this statutory safe harbor applies to 
all “infringement of copyright,” including infringement of nonpreempted 
state copyright law.155 
In that case, the owner of the copyright in several pre-1972 sound 
recordings brought claims for direct, secondary, and vicarious copyright 
infringement against Vimeo, an Internet service provider that allows users 
to post videos to its website.156  Although federal copyright law protects 
sound recordings made after February 15, 1972, and thus the DMCA safe 
harbor clearly applies to those recordings, any sound recordings made 
before that date are protected, if at all, only by state copyright law.157  
Vimeo argued that the safe harbor should also extend to protect Internet 
service providers from liability for violating state copyright laws.158  The 
district court disagreed, holding that § 512 of the DMCA did not apply to 
pre-1972 sound recordings, as those recordings are protected by state, not 
federal, law.159  On Vimeo’s motion to reconsider, the district court 
certified the question to the Second Circuit.160 
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the DMCA’s safe harbor did in 
fact apply to state copyright infringement claims.161  In a unanimous 
opinion authored by Judge Pierre N. Leval, the Second Circuit panel 
focused primarily on the language of § 512(c), which releases a service 
provider from liability for “infringement of copyright” if certain 
requirements are satisfied.162  While the district court (and the Copyright 
Office in a 2011 report addressing the issue)163 had interpreted the phrase 
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“infringement of copyright” to mean a violation of federal copyright,164 the 
Second Circuit disagreed, noting that no definition of infringement exists in 
the Copyright Act, and therefore a “literal and natural reading of the text of 
§ 512(c) leads to the conclusion that its use of the phrase ‘infringement of 
copyright’ does include infringement of state laws of copyright.”165 
In reaching its decision, the court explained the compromise represented 
by the DMCA safe harbor:  in exchange for relief of liability from 
infringement about which they had no knowledge, Internet service 
providers are obligated to promptly remove infringing works upon 
notice.166  Excluding works protected only by state copyright would defeat 
the statutory purpose of having a safe harbor:  “Service providers would be 
compelled either to incur heavy costs of monitoring every posting to be sure 
it did not contain infringing pre-1972 records, or incurring potentially 
crushing liabilities under state copyright laws.”167 
The Second Circuit’s holding is noteworthy in part because it rejected the 
Copyright Office’s interpretation of § 512(c).  Judge Leval first 
acknowledged that “we do recognize the Copyright Office’s intimate 
familiarity with the copyright statute and would certainly give appropriate 
deference to its reasonably persuasive interpretations of the Copyright Act” 
but then declined to adopt its interpretation because in matters of statutory 
interpretation, the court need not defer to a governmental agency.168  In 
addition, the decision implicitly rejected the conclusions of a New York 
appellate court in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Group, Inc.169  
There, the court held that the DMCA and its safe harbor only apply to post-
1972 recordings, relying on Congress’s express “directive in . . . the 
Copyright Act that nothing in the Act would ‘annul’ or ‘limit’ the common-
law copyright protections attendant to any sound recordings fixed before 
February 15, 1972.”170 
The Second Circuit’s holding in Capitol Records also is noteworthy 
because it continues the circuit’s approach of protecting the free flow of 
information on the internet and the growth of innovative technology 
companies.  Thus, the decision in Capitol Records can be seen as a natural 
extension of the Second Circuit’s holding in Viacom, and further reinforces 
the view that copyright holders should not be allowed to avoid the 
protections Congress afforded Internet service providers in the DMCA.  If 
the case had been decided differently, liability for unauthorized copies of 
pre-1972 recordings could have imposed a significant burden on Internet 
service providers, including compliance and litigation costs as well as 
possible adverse damage verdicts. 
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Given the panel’s sound and well-documented reasoning regarding the 
purpose and legislative history behind the DMCA, one can predict with 
confidence that other federal courts will follow suit if and when similar 
cases are initiated. 
E.  Industrial Design and Conceptual Separability 
The Second Circuit redefined the contours of the conceptual separability 
doctrine in the landmark case Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific 
Lumber Co.171  Examining conceptual separability both under the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and as set forth in prior decisions, Judge James 
L. Oakes established a new approach clarifying the line between 
copyrightable expression and utilitarian function.  Addressing whether a 
bicycle rack, adapted from a minimalist sculpture, was copyrightable, the 
court concluded that because the bicycle rack reflected a “merger of 
aesthetic and functional considerations,” the artistic aspects were not 
conceptually separable from the function, and therefore the useful article 
was not copyrightable.172  This influential decision has limited the scope of 
copyright protection for industrial design. 
One of the owners of Brandir, the plaintiff, had created an original wire 
sculpture from “one continuous undulating piece of wire” and later 
translated the sculpture into a bicycle rack.173  The lawsuit challenged a 
competitor’s right to produce similar racks.174  Since the defendant could be 
liable for copyright infringement only if it had appropriated protected 
expression, whether copyright law protected the rack was the primary issue 
in the dispute.175  The court noted that the Copyright Office had denied 
Brandir’s application for registration because the bicycle rack lacked any 
element that was “capable of independent existence as a copyrightable 
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work apart from the shape of the useful 
article.”176 
The court analyzed both the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 
1976 as well as case law defining conceptual separability.177  According to 
the Act, a useful article is copyrightable “if, and only to the extent that, [its] 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.”178  The legislative history added that an 
artistic element could be separable conceptually as well as physically.179  In 
addition, the opinion addressed and sought to reconcile two previous 
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Second Circuit cases, Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,180 and 
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.181 
In Kieselstein-Cord, also authored by Judge Oakes, the court had held 
that a stylized belt buckle was conceptually separable, even if not physically 
separable, and thus qualified for copyright protection.182  Noting that the 
buckle was worn as jewelry and displayed in museums, the Kieselstein-
Cord court held that the function of the buckle was secondary to its 
ornamental purpose.183  However, in Barnhart, in an opinion by Judge 
Walter R. Mansfield, the court had found that mannequins were not 
copyrightable because none of the design elements were conceptually 
separable.184 
Seeking to reconcile these earlier holdings, Judge Oakes cited a 
Minnesota Law Review article by Professor Robert C. Denicola that had 
argued that copyrightability of useful articles “ultimately should depend on 
the extent to which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by 
functional considerations.”185  The court translated Denicola’s test into “the 
language of conceptual separability”:  only design elements that reflect 
artistic judgment entirely independent of functional influences are 
conceptually separable.186  At the same time, any elements that were 
influenced at all by functional considerations are not separable.187  
According to the court, this approach was consistent with previous case 
law, in that the design of the belt in Kieselstein-Cord had no functional 
purpose whatsoever, whereas the mannequin forms in Barnhart were 
crafted for their utilitarian function.188 
Applying the test to the bicycle rack in Brandir, the court held that the 
rack was not copyrightable.189  Though adapted from a sculptural work of 
art, the rack itself was a product of functional constraints, as the form of the 
sculpture had been altered to make the rack useful.190 
Brandir has been applied by several other federal courts of appeals.191  
The Brandir conceptual separability doctrine sets a high bar for industrial 
designers seeking copyright protection, as any consideration of function in 
the design process jeopardizes copyright protection.  Perhaps for this 
 
 180. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 181. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 182. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993–94. 
 183. See id. at 993. 
 184. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 424–26. 
 185. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987); 
see also Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design:  A Suggested Approach to 
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741 (1983). 
 186. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. at 1144. 
 189. See id. at 1146. 
 190. See id. at 1147. 
 191. See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1041 n.2 (9th Cir 
2014); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488, 494 
(4th Cir. 1996). 
2016] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 163 
reason, other courts have applied modified, more lenient standards of 
copyrightability.192 
F.  International Copyright Disputes and Choice of Law 
Given that federal law has exclusively governed copyright in the United 
States for decades, it is unsurprising that there are a few choice-of-law 
decisions in copyright jurisprudence.  However, as world commerce 
expanded in the 1990s, and technological advances made it easier than ever 
to access—and to copy—creative works from other countries, U.S. federal 
courts faced choice-of-law issues in copyright infringement cases involving 
cross-border disputes. 
One influential discussion on this topic is found in the Second Circuit’s 
decision by Judge Jon O. Newman in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. 
Russian Kurier, Inc.193  Itar-Tass involved a claim by Russian publishers, 
news services, and journalists alleging copyright infringement of numerous 
news articles that an American newspaper and its publisher had copied in 
their weekly paper.194  Because the defendants conceded wholesale 
copying, the court considered only whether plaintiffs owned a valid 
copyright in the works and, if so, whether the copyright had been 
infringed.195 
The primary issue the court addressed in Itar-Tass was which 
jurisdiction’s law should govern the issues of ownership and 
infringement.196  Russian copyright law explicitly excluded newspaper 
articles from the “work-made-for-hire” doctrine, meaning that if Russian 
law applied, the copyright in the articles was owned by the Russian 
journalists; if U.S. law applied, the copyright was owned by their 
employers.197 
The court held that the law of the jurisdiction where the copyrighted 
work was created should generally apply to the issue of copyright 
ownership.198  More specifically, the court noted that copyright, as a type of 
intellectual property, should be treated like any other form of property.199  
Thus, the usual choice-of-law rule for property—that the jurisdiction with 
the “most significant relationship” to the property will provide the 
governing law—should apply to questions involving intellectual property 
ownership.200  Conversely, the court held that the question of whether 
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infringement has occurred is governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which the alleged infringement took place, consistent with tort law.201 
Itar-Tass has been cited in First,202 Fifth,203 Ninth,204 and Eleventh205 
Circuit opinions.  Nimmer on Copyright has dedicated an entire section to 
the Itar-Tass decision and its lasting effects on choice of law in copyright 
cases, in the United States and in other jurisdictions as well.206 
G.  Joint Authorship 
Who is, or is not, a joint author of a copyrighted work can be a 
contentious issue, especially if a work is financially valuable.  The 
Copyright Act of 1976 defines a “joint work” as a “work prepared by two 
or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into 
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”207  Because joint 
authorship entitles coauthors “to equal undivided interests in the whole 
work,” each coauthor enjoys the “right to use or to license the work as he or 
she wishes, subject only to the obligation to account to the other joint owner 
for any profits that are made.”208 
In two cases decided in the 1990s, the Second Circuit addressed joint 
authorship in decisions that became leading precedents on this issue.  In the 
earlier of the two cases, Childress v. Taylor,209 Judge Jon O. Newman 
established a two-prong standard for determining—in the absence of any 
written agreement addressing the issue—“when a contributor to a 
copyrighted work is entitled to be regarded as a joint author.”210  The court 
determined that a more “stringent inquiry than the statutory language” was 
required to avoid “extend[ing] joint author status to many persons who are 
not likely to have been within the contemplation of Congress.”211 
The Childress decision involved accusations of copyright infringement 
by playwright Alice Childress against actress Clarice Taylor.212  Taylor had 
persuaded Childress to compose a script profiling the life of comedienne 
Jackie “Moms” Mabley, with Taylor to play the lead role.213  During the 
script-writing process, Taylor contributed a number of factual findings 
about the life of Mabley and suggested a number of scenes.214  Childress 
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obtained a copyright for the play in her name alone.215  When Taylor staged 
a production with a revised script authored by another playwright, Childress 
sued for copyright infringement, and Taylor asserted joint ownership.216 
The court upheld a grant of summary judgment for Childress, concluding 
that Taylor’s contributions never “evolved into more than the helpful advice 
that might come from the cast, the directors, or the producers of any 
play.”217  The court concluded that notwithstanding Taylor’s contributions, 
“Childress was responsible for the actual structure of the play and the 
dialogue.”218  In so holding, the court established a two-part test to address 
joint authorship, with the intention of the parties as its cornerstone, 
requiring that (1) each putative joint author make independently 
copyrightable contributions to the work and (2) there be an intention that 
they be coauthors.219  While the first prong had precedents, the second 
prong was an innovation often referred to as the “Childress rule of mutual 
co-authorship intent.”220 
The Childress joint authorship test has influenced decisions in the First 
and Seventh Circuits, as well as the District of Puerto Rico.221  The Ninth 
Circuit has incorporated the Childress test into its own joint authorship 
test.222  In a 1999 district court decision in Louisiana, the court held that 
“[s]ince the Fifth Circuit has yet to delineate a stance on the elements for 
finding joint authorship under § 101, this [c]ourt will follow the excellent 
analysis of the Second Circuit.”223 
The Second Circuit decision in Thomson v. Larson,224 authored by Judge 
Guido Calabresi, also made significant contributions to joint authorship law 
by elaborating on the Childress test and cataloging factual inquiries that 
could prove relevant to the application of the standard.  Thomson involved a 
dispute over joint ownership of the Broadway production of Rent.225  
Larson, a playwright, hired Thomson, a dramaturg, to help refine the 
storyline.226  Just after the final dress rehearsal, Larson tragically died.227  
The show became a commercial success and Thomson later sued the Larson 
estate, claiming that she was a coauthor.228 
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The court found that Thompson did make copyrightable contributions, 
but it held that there was no mutual coauthorship intent.229  The dramaturg 
had no decision-making authority, she had neither sought nor was billed as 
a coauthor, and Larson had entered into contracts as the sole author.230  The 
record also showed that Larson repeatedly rejected hiring a book writer.231  
On these facts and others, the Second Circuit held that there was no intent 
to be joint authors, and therefore Thompson’s claim did not meet the 
Childress test.232 
In total, more than one-half of the length of this intellectual property 
Article is devoted to Second Circuit copyright decisions.  While the court’s 
particular prominence in this field may not be as pronounced today as in the 
past, recent decisions such as those in Viacom and Google Books show that 
the Second Circuit’s accumulated experience and expertise will continue to 
influence the future direction of copyright law as new technologies emerge. 
II.  LANHAM ACT ISSUES 
The title to this part refers to the Lanham Act, not trademark law, for 
convenience of organization.  The Lanham Act covers at least three 
somewhat distinct substantive areas:  trademark, dilution, and 
advertising.233  The discussion begins with Judge Henry J. Friendly’s 1976 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.234 decision, one of the 
most influential Second Circuit decisions in the intellectual property field, 
dealing with the classification of the degrees of distinctiveness of marks.  
Fifteen years earlier, the court, also in an opinion by Judge Friendly, 
articulated the first of the multifactor tests for confusion, an approach 
adopted and applied in all federal circuits.235 
A.  Classification of a Term for Trademark Eligibility 
It is widely accepted today that to determine whether a term can be 
protected as a trademark, one typically begins with an analysis of the four 
Abercrombie & Fitch categories of distinctiveness.236  These range from a 
mark that has the highest level of inherent distinctiveness (fanciful or 
arbitrary) to a term that can never be protected as a trademark (generic).237 
A common way to explain the hierarchy is to reference the word “apple.”  
When used to describe the fruit, the word is generic.  When used to describe 
a pie or cake made from the fruit, the term is descriptive.  When used in 
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“Apple-a-Day” for vitamin tablets, the mark is suggestive—enough 
inherent strength to qualify for trademark protection without more.  When 
used to refer to computers, the term is arbitrary and has the highest degree 
of inherent strength.238 
Why are they referred to as the Abercrombie & Fitch categories?  In 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Judge Henry J. Friendly articulated what the 
Supreme Court has referred to, not once, but twice, as the “classic” test or 
formulation for evaluating the distinctiveness of a word mark.239  Judge 
Friendly’s organization and description of the four categories—arbitrary, 
fanciful, suggestive, and generic—has been cited in over 800 court 
decisions as well as in the leading treatises.240 
The dispute in that case arose in a lawsuit by Abercrombie and Fitch 
(A&F) against competitor Hunting World (HW) for alleged infringement of 
several of A&F’s registered trademarks using the word “Safari” for sporting 
apparel.241  Between the late 1930s and the filing of the lawsuit, A&F had 
continuously used “Safari” in connection with men’s and women’s 
apparel.242  HW counterclaimed, arguing that “Safari” was a generic 
term.243 
In the Second Circuit’s opinion, Judge Friendly began by setting forth the 
distinctiveness framework—arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and 
generic—and discussing the differing scopes of protection afforded to each 
category.244  Turning to the facts in the case, the court concluded that (1) 
“Safari” was a generic term when used in connection with particular types 
of clothing and marketing tactics and (2) as applied to boots and shoes, 
“Safari” was suggestive or “merely descriptive” and was a protectable 
trademark, even if “merely descriptive,” because it had become 
incontestable.245  However, in light of the lower court’s findings, HW had a 
valid defense of fair use under section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act, where 
HW’s use of “Safari” for boots was purely descriptive because “[w]hen a 
plaintiff has chosen a mark with some descriptive qualities, he cannot 
altogether exclude some kinds of competing uses even when the mark is 
properly on the register.”246  Thus, the facts of the dispute gave Judge 
Friendly the opportunity not only to set forth and explain commonly used 
trademark law principles but also to apply those principles to a complex set 
of facts and illustrate how they worked in practice. 
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B.  Multifactor Tests to Evaluate the 
Likelihood of Confusion Issue 
Whether the alleged infringer’s conduct created a likelihood of confusion 
is at the heart of almost every trademark infringement dispute (with the 
possible exception of cases brought by licensors against alleged former 
licensees).  Curiously (or perhaps not), each of the federal circuits has 
developed its own multifactor test evaluating confusion.247  However, as the 
Supreme Court indicated recently in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis 
Industries, Inc.,248 in comparing the multifactor tests used in two circuits, 
the substantive differences, if any, among the varying tests are likely 
relatively minimal and not likely to be outcome determinative.249 
Notably, the Second Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to 
organize the various factors cited in the cases (primarily derived from the 
1938 Restatement (First) of Torts) and articulate a cohesive test for 
likelihood of confusion.  In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecronics Corp.,250 
in an opinion by Judge Henry J. Friendly, the court set forth for the first 
time the eight factors (subsequently referred to as the Polaroid factors) to 
be considered when addressing the question of likelihood of trademark 
confusion.251  As Professor J. Thomas McCarthy makes clear in his 
extensive discussion of the various circuit multifactor tests, the Polaroid 
case is the earliest likelihood of confusion decision still remaining in force 
today, predating the next earliest decision, In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & 
Co.,252 employed by the Federal Circuit, by over a decade.253  In this area, 
also, it is fair to state that a Second Circuit decision carved a new path 
forward on a critical issue in intellectual property law, one that has not 
fundamentally changed in more than fifty-five years. 
C.  Challenges to Trademark Rights 
in the E-Commerce Era 
E-commerce, now ubiquitous, has unsurprisingly raised challenging 
issues concerning the protection of intellectual property rights.  In a lawsuit 
brought by the owner of a tradition-laden famous brand, Tiffany Inc., 
against a contemporary, but similarly iconic, e-commerce brand, eBay, the 
Second Circuit weighed in on the balance between protecting the 
development of the e-commerce marketplace versus protecting the brands 
sold there.254 
In 2004, the world-famous producer and retailer of branded jewelry 
asserted Lanham Act claims against the Internet auction site alleging, 
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among other things, trademark infringement and dilution because large 
quantities of purportedly “Tiffany” goods sold on eBay were, in actuality, 
counterfeit.255  In the four-year period addressed in the lawsuit, eBay 
generated over $4 million in revenue from the sale of Tiffany-branded 
products, and it was not disputed that a “substantial” amount of the 
“Tiffany” jewelry sold on eBay was counterfeit.256  At trial, eBay’s own 
expert testified that 30 percent or more of the products could be deemed 
counterfeit.257  Tiffany sought to hold eBay liable for, among other things, 
direct and contributory trademark infringement and trademark dilution.258  
After a nonjury trial, the district court decided for eBay on all claims and 
Tiffany appealed.259 
Citing the significant anticounterfeiting measures eBay had taken over 
the years, the Second Circuit, in a decision by Judge Robert D. Sack, 
affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to trademark 
infringement and dilution.260  The court easily dispensed with the direct 
claims, concluding that eBay had the right to use the Tiffany trademark to 
describe genuine Tiffany goods sold on its website and that there could be 
no dilution where eBay did not use Tiffany’s marks in association with 
eBay’s own products.261 
The more difficult issue, and a matter of first impression, was whether 
eBay was accountable for the counterfeit sales on a contributory 
infringement theory.262  That judicially created doctrine, rooted in tort law, 
had been set forth at length by the Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,263 in the context of manufacturers and 
distributors.  Without deciding whether Inwood applied to service 
providers, the Second Circuit noted that there were two ways for service 
providers to be liable under the Inwood test:  (1) if the provider 
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark or (2) if the provider 
continues to supply its service to one whom it knows or has reason to 
believe is engaging in trademark infringement.264 
Tiffany argued unsuccessfully that eBay was liable under the second 
prong.265  According to the court, Tiffany failed to show that eBay was 
supplying its services to individuals it knew or had reason to know were 
selling counterfeits.266  Willful blindness, the court noted, is tantamount to 
knowledge—but eBay, which had instituted numerous fraud-detection 
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programs, did not act with willful blindness.267  The court held that to be 
held liable for contributory infringement, a service provider must have more 
than general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to 
sell counterfeit goods.268  Rather, the service provider must have some 
contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are or will infringe.269 
In basing its decision on existing legal principles, and applying them to 
new technologies, the court avoided the risk of disrupting the development 
of new and developing forms of commerce.  The decision reflected judicial 
restraint, leaving the fashioning of new safeguards for brand holders, if 
appropriate, to the legislative, political process. 
D.  Admissibility of Survey Evidence 
in Lanham Act Cases 
The use of survey evidence in Lanham Act lawsuits is not uncommon.  In 
the trademark area, surveys are often relied on to address the issue of 
likelihood of confusion, as well as genericness and secondary meaning.  In 
false advertising cases, surveys can determine whether an advertisement 
communicates an implied (nonliteral) message to the intended audience.  As 
a consequence of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,270 and its 
progeny, including Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the district courts are 
authorized to act as gatekeepers with respect to all expert testimony.271  
That necessarily led to the question of what the post-Daubert standards 
would be for surveys offered in Lanham Act cases. 
In the leading case addressing that issue, Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, 
Inc.,272 in a comprehensive opinion by then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor, the 
Second Circuit firmly established the majority rule that, generally, most 
alleged defects in survey methodology go to the credibility, and not the 
admissibility, of a survey, and thus in Lanham Act cases surveys should 
rarely be excluded from evidence.273 
Plaintiff Schering, the manufacturer of Claritin, concerned that a 
competitor was misrepresenting the nonsedative properties of a competing 
prescription drug, commissioned a survey among physicians that had been 
visited by the competitor’s representatives.274  The survey allegedly 
confirmed that false messages were being delivered, and Schering filed a 
Lanham Act lawsuit that ended with a settlement.275  Schering then 
conducted additional surveys to monitor compliance with the terms of the 
settlement and filed a second lawsuit based on the survey results.276  In the 
course of discovery, the plaintiff found surveys commissioned by the 
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competitor and moved for a preliminary injunction, citing in support a total 
of five surveys.277  The district court granted defendants’ Daubert motion to 
exclude the five surveys and denied the preliminary injunction.278 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that several of the surveys should 
have been considered and remanded for reconsideration of the admissibility 
of the others.279  To reach this result, then-Judge Sotomayor conducted an 
exhaustive analysis of the exceptions to the hearsay rule that permitted 
survey evidence to be admitted.280  On the issue of surveys considered 
under the state-of-mind exception in Rule 803(3) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the court held that “errors in methodology . . . properly go only to 
the weight of the evidence—subject, of course, to Rule 403’s more general 
prohibition against evidence that is less probative than prejudicial or 
confusing.”281 
The principles set forth in Schering reflect the realities of survey practice 
in Lanham Act cases.  Every survey proffered by one party is inevitably 
countered by the opposing party’s critiquing expert who pronounces the 
survey fatally flawed.  Thus, there is ample opportunity for the fact finder to 
weigh and resolve the evidence on survey credibility or to simply ignore the 
experts and decide the disputed issues based on other evidence. 
One post-Daubert appellate decision, Southland Sod Farms v. Stover 
Seed Co.,282 had briefly considered the survey admissibility issue before the 
Second Circuit, but the Schering decision, with its comprehensive analysis 
of the hearsay issues and pre-Daubert precedent, is the leading case on the 
admissibility of surveys in Lanham Act lawsuits.  Professor McCarthy, for 
example, cites to Schering in eight separate sections of his treatise.  In all, 
Schering has been cited almost 1,000 times.  While other circuits follow the 
majority rule set forth in Schering without necessarily citing the decision,283 
district court decisions outside the Second Circuit frequently rely on it.284 
E.  The Territoriality Principle 
and the Famous Marks Doctrine 
Under the territoriality principle recognized by courts in the United 
States (and generally around the world), a trademark has a separate legal 
existence under each country’s laws.285  Therefore, ownership of a 
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trademark in one country does not grant the owner any rights to the use of 
that trademark in another. 
Under the “famous marks” doctrine, however, a trademark that is neither 
used nor registered in a country can still qualify for protection there if it is 
“well known” among the relevant class of consumers.  For example, when a 
U.S. entity sought registration of the “Wimbledon” trademark for cologne 
in the United States, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) held 
that the operators of the Wimbledon Tennis Tournament in England had 
standing to oppose the registration due to sufficient recognition of 
“Wimbledon” by U.S. consumers, even though the trademark had not been 
used or registered in the United States.286  Interestingly, the TTAB 
grounded its holding in state unfair competition law, not trademark law.287  
State courts have also applied the famous marks doctrine in the context of 
unfair competition claims.288  Professor McCarthy has opined that 
recognition by 50 percent of relevant consumers should be sufficient to 
invoke the doctrine.289 
No U.S. federal circuit court had ever endorsed the doctrine until 2004, 
when the Ninth Circuit did so as a matter of federal trademark law in Grupo 
Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co.,290 involving a chain of Mexican 
grocery stores.  Observing that the famous marks doctrine constituted “an 
exception to the territoriality principle,” the court based its holding on 
policy grounds, noting that “[a]n absolute territoriality rule without a 
famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and fraud.  
Commerce crosses borders.  In this nation of immigrants, so do people.”291 
Three years later, the Second Circuit disagreed in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, 
Inc.,292 an opinion by Judge Reena Raggi.  At issue in that case was the 
“Bukhara” trademark for restaurants.293  Plaintiff in that case owned and 
operated a renowned Bukhara restaurant in India, as well as several other 
Bukhara restaurants in Asia.294  While it had also previously operated 
Indian restaurants under the Bukhara trademark in both Manhattan and 
Chicago, those had closed a number of years prior to the lawsuit, and the 
mark in the United States was deemed abandoned.295  The dispute arose 
when three former employees of the Bukhara restaurant in India opened two 
Bukhara Grill restaurants in Manhattan, which “mimic[ed] the ITC 
Bukhara’s logos, décor, staff uniforms, wood-slab menus, and red-
checkered customer bibs.”296 
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In the Second Circuit’s opinion, Judge Raggi examined the history of the 
territoriality principle, repeatedly emphasizing the absence of congressional 
implementation of the doctrine through the Lanham Act.297  Explaining that 
the famous marks doctrine originated from the 1925 addition of article 6bis 
to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,298 the 
court noted that the treaty was not self-executing and its terms had never 
been given legal effect in the United States through implementing 
legislation.299  Turning to the applicability of New York state court cases 
that had adopted the famous marks doctrine, the court explained that the 
cases were not grounded in trademark law, but entirely on New York 
common law principles of unfair competition.300  And, because the TTAB 
decisions affirming the doctrine were grounded in state law, the court 
concluded that the doctrine “falls outside the sphere to which [the Second 
Circuit] owe[s] deference.”301 
Turning to the Ninth Circuit decision in Grupo Gigante, the court first 
acknowledged that the famous marks doctrine had twice been considered in 
the Second Circuit,302 noting that in one case the doctrine was inapplicable 
because the plaintiff did not raise the issue,303 while in the other, the court 
declined to address the doctrine because the Cuban plaintiff there was 
barred by an embargo from acquiring property rights in the relevant 
trademark.304  The court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, and rejected the 
doctrine under the Lanham Act because Congress had not incorporated the 
substantive protections into the statute.305  The Supreme Court subsequently 
declined review,306 there has been no action from Congress, and no circuit 
outside of the Second or Ninth has addressed the issue. 
In light of the Second Circuit’s holding in ITC, the famous marks 
doctrine, which had arguably been considered an exception to the 
territoriality principle for decades, now has an uncertain future in the United 
States.  The Second Circuit’s approach has certain doctrinal advantages, in 
that multinational businesses are on notice that they must take steps to 
protect their marks on the world market.  The rejection of the famous marks 
doctrine also eliminates a problematic legal theory that can be difficult to 
apply, as evidenced by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Grupo Gigante, where 
the court created a whole new category of mark strength which had 
previously not existed, defined as something more than secondary meaning 
but less than fame, requiring recognition by a substantial number of 
 
 297. See id. at 155–56. 
 298. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967). 
 299. ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 161–62. 
 300. Id. at 157. 
 301. Id. at 159. 
 302. See id. at 160. 
 303. See id.; see also Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 304. See ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 160; see also Empressa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro 
Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 471 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 305. See ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 163–64. 
 306. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 552 U.S. 827 (2007) (denying certiorari). 
174 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
consumers in the relevant U.S. market.307  Moreover, while much talked 
about and perhaps more relevant in Europe, the doctrine had rarely been 
used to protect marks in the United States.  Finally, the court was careful to 
not interfere with continued state law development and application of the 
principle, and indeed obtained, via certification, a clarifying opinion on 
state law from the New York Court of Appeals.308 
F.  Use of Survey Evidence to Address False Advertising Claims 
in Lanham Act Lawsuits 
There seems little doubt that the Lanham Act, adopted in 1948, was 
considered by its drafters to be a trademark statute and that it was the 
federal courts that developed what later became an extensive federal 
common law that allowed a marketer to sue a competitor for alleged false or 
misleading advertising.309  After a relatively lengthy period of slow 
development, this area of federal jurisprudence began to grow significantly 
in the 1980s.  A database search shows that between the passage of the 
Lanham Act and the Second Circuit’s decision in American Home Products 
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,310 there were 56 cases discussing false 
advertising in a Lanham Act context; between the court’s decision in 1978 
and 2000, that number increased to 923 decisions.311  Contributing to this 
trend, in 1978 the Second Circuit became the first federal appeals court to 
put its imprimatur on the use of consumer survey evidence as a means of 
showing that an advertisement that could be considered truthful when read 
literally could nevertheless be actionable as misleading because it 
communicated a false implied message.312 
In American Home Products, two leading producers of over-the-counter 
pain relief medications—American Home Products (AHP), the maker of 
Anacin, and McNeil Laboratories, Inc. (“McNeil”), a subsidiary of Johnson 
& Johnson and the maker of Tylenol—cross-appealed from a lower court 
order enjoining AHP from making certain superiority claims.313  Anacin 
contained aspirin and caffeine and had been, until supplanted by Tylenol, 
the leading over-the-counter analgesic.314  The challenged AHP television 
and magazine advertisements asserted Anacin’s superiority to Tylenol.315  
Faced with McNeil’s protests to the major television networks, AHP filed a 
declaratory judgment action.316  Relying heavily on a consumer survey of 
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analgesic purchasers exposed to the advertisements, McNeil counterclaimed 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.317 
The district court relied primarily on consumer survey evidence in 
finding that AHP’s television advertisement represented that Anacin is a 
superior product generally and not superior only because Anacin reduced 
inflammation while Tylenol did not.318  AHP appealed, arguing that 
because its advertisements did not expressly claim that Anacin is a superior 
analgesic to Tylenol, consumer survey evidence should not have been 
considered.319 
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge James L. Oakes, rejected 
AHP’s contention that its advertisements were unambiguous and affirmed 
the use of consumer survey evidence to interpret an ambiguous consumer 
message.320  The Lanham Act’s reach, the court said, extends beyond literal 
falsehoods to those statements that, despite being literally true, have a 
tendency to mislead, confuse, or deceive consumers.321  The court found 
that both the television and print advertisements used “pain” and 
“inflammation” to ambiguous effect, and thus the lower court properly 
looked to consumer response data to determine what meaning was actually 
communicated.322  According to the court, the district judge was not only 
warranted in looking to the consumer survey evidence but, given the 
ambiguity of the advertisements’ messages, “may have been compelled” to 
do so—thus underlining the importance of survey evidence in determining 
what messages advertisements convey to the relevant consumer 
population.323 
Following the American Home Products decision, the use of consumer 
communication surveys in Lanham Act false advertising lawsuits in short 
order became a standard strategic option. 
G.  Dilution Principles 
According to a leading scholar and professor, the concept of dilution has 
created more “doctrinal puzzlement and judicial incomprehension” than any 
other aspect of trademark law.324  Dilution is a doctrine that protects rights 
in famous marks and does not require evidence of consumer confusion.325  
In the United States, the development of the doctrine dates from a much-
cited Harvard Law Review article written by Frank I. Schechter.326 
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For several decades following the Schechter article, a number of states 
adopted antidilution statutes, but the doctrine did not become a subject of 
significant litigation until Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act of 1995327 (FTDA), codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125.328  Shortly after its 
adoption, the Supreme Court nullified the usefulness of the statute by 
interpreting it literally,329 and Congress passed the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act of 2006330 (TDRA), to put life back into the statute. 
While the Second Circuit has decided a number of cases during the 
evolution of trademark dilution law, two are worth noting:  Deere & Co. v. 
MTD Products Inc.331 and Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, 
Inc.332  Before there was a federal statute, Deere & Company, a 
manufacturer of agricultural machinery and other equipment, prevailed in 
establishing dilution under New York law.333  Deere sought a nationwide 
injunction, but the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Jon O. Newman, 
disagreed.334  The court noted that New York’s antidilution statute differed 
from other states’ statutes, and therefore there was no basis to issue a 
nationwide injunction.335  Thus, the decision highlighted the anomaly of 
state dilution laws being relied on to protect nationally famous marks. 
During the period between the initial adoption of the federal statute and 
the 2006 revision, courts developed standards for proving a likelihood of 
dilution because the FTDA had not set forth any such standards.  A number 
of courts had held that to establish a likelihood of dilution, the plaintiff 
needed to show that the two marks were substantially similar.  In the 
TDRA, Congress set forth specific factors to be considered for proving a 
likelihood of dilution, one of which is the “similarity between the 
mark[s].”336 
In Starbucks, the Second Circuit was the first appellate court to interpret 
the revised Act.337  In an opinion by Judge Roger J. Miner, the court held 
that the statute did not require substantial similarity.338  The court noted that 
the TDRA sets forth a six-factor test for dilution by blurring, and did not 
include a requirement of substantial similarity.339  Therefore, the mere lack 
of substantial similarity was not sufficient to dismiss dilution claims.340  
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Two years after this opinion, the next time a court of appeals addressed the 
issue, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation.341 
As can be seen from the discussion above, while influential Second 
Circuit decisions in the trademark, dilution, and false advertising areas are 
not as abundant as in the copyright area, the Second Circuit has 
nevertheless been a thought leader in these areas. 
III.  RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
To celebrities, the right of publicity can be an extremely valuable 
personal asset, as is evident from common advertising campaigns, such as a 
sports drink promoted by a prominent athlete, as well as the numerous 
lawsuits seeking to protect that right.  The term “right of publicity” dates to 
a pivotal 1953 Second Circuit decision.342 
A.  Creation of the Right of Publicity 
Many states recognize the right of publicity by statute or by common law 
development.  Noteworthy right of publicity cases include the famous 
singer Bette Midler successfully prosecuting a right of publicity claim 
against an advertiser who used a soundalike who replicated her vocal 
styling.343  In another case, the well-recognized “Here’s Johnny” 
introductory phrase to Johnny Carson’s Tonight Show was found to violate 
Carson’s rights when used in an advertisement for portable restrooms.344 
Historically, the right of publicity evolved from privacy theory.  In 1890, 
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis outlined a novel legal theory that 
promoted a limited application of privacy rights (“the right to be let alone”) 
in their famous Harvard Law Review essay.345  In 1903, New York adopted 
the nation’s first right of privacy statute, N.Y. Civil Rights Law sections 49 
and 50, following the New York Court of Appeals’s rejection of the 
theory.346  In the years following, the right of privacy led to many cases 
brought by celebrity plaintiffs, but privacy law proved inadequate to 
accommodate “uncompensated, rather than unwelcome publicity.”347 
In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,348 Haelan, the 
plaintiff gum manufacturer, had secured the exclusive right to use the 
images of a celebrated baseball player on its baseball cards.349  The 
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defendant, Topps Chewing Gum, was a competing gum manufacturer that 
wanted to use the baseball player’s image for its advertisements.350 
The court in Haelan, in an opinion by Judge Jerome N. Frank, ruled for 
the plaintiff, holding that a natural person has a right in the publicity value 
of his or her photograph, independent of the right to privacy, and that “this 
right might be called a right of publicity.”351  That right, the court 
explained, afforded a person the same benefits as with any other property 
right, namely that the right is exclusive, assignable, and descendible.352  
Judge Frank’s articulation thus established the rationale for the 
development of the right of publicity, as an adjunct to, but also independent 
of, the statutory right of privacy. 
B.  Standards for Resolving Disputes Between the Right 
of Publicity and Competing First Amendment Rights 
As it has developed and expanded, the right of publicity has raised 
complex issues concerning the tension between the exercise of First 
Amendment rights versus an individual’s control over the commercial use 
of his or her identity.  This tension was examined in the seminal case 
Rogers v. Grimaldi.353  Noted actress Ginger Rogers asserted a right of 
publicity, as well as Lanham Act false endorsement claims, against the 
producers and distributors of famed director Federico Fellini’s movie 
“Ginger and Fred.”354  The film told the story of two fictional Italian 
cabaret performers who imitated Rogers and her frequent film partner, Fred 
Astaire.355  Rogers alleged that the movie title violated, among other things, 
her right of publicity.356 
In the district court, Judge Robert W. Sweet granted summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants.357  In an opinion by Judge Jon O. Newman 
affirming the district court, the Second Circuit noted that “suppressing an 
artistically relevant though ambiguous[ly] title[d]” film on trademark 
grounds would “unduly restrict expression.”358  The Rogers court fashioned 
a test for artistic titles—the artist is free to use a personal name of a 
celebrity in a movie title unless the use “has no artistic relevance to the 
underlying work whatsoever,”359 or is “simply a disguised commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.”360  The court also set forth 
a comparable test for alleged false endorsement.361 
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Rogers has been applied widely outside the Second Circuit (albeit more 
often in the false endorsement context), in decisions expanding the Rogers 
standards well beyond film titles.  The Fifth Circuit, for instance, applied 
Rogers to a book title.362  The Ninth Circuit went further and applied the 
Rogers formulation to a case involving the use of a trademark in the body 
of a work.363  The Sixth Circuit applied the Rogers test to a nontitle element 
of a work in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.364 
IV.  PRE-FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT DECISIONS 
WORTHY OF NOTE 
It has been more than thirty years since intermediate appellate 
jurisdiction for patent cases was consolidated in the Federal Circuit, which 
was created for that purpose.  Pre-Federal Circuit cases, nevertheless, are 
still of precedential value and a number are still influential—or at least 
worth noting—including the four Second Circuit decisions discussed below. 
A.  Defining a Printed Publication 
Semantics are at the heart of patent law.  Every patent case revolves 
around parsing the meaning of words in the patent claims and, in turn, 
parsing the words of the applicable patent statute.  Despite several major 
modifications to the patent laws since the decision issued in 1928, Judge 
Learned Hand’s analysis of what constitutes a “printed publication” in 
Jockmus v. Leviton,365 remains authoritative. 
Of particular significance is Judge Hand’s distinction between the 
physical nature of a publication and the manner of its dissemination: 
A single copy in a library, though more permanent, is far less fitted to 
inform the craft than a catalogue freely circulated, however ephemeral its 
existence; for the catalogue goes direct to those whose interests make 
them likely to observe and remember whatever it may contain that is new 
and useful.366 
In a modern world in which “publications” may be increasingly ephemeral 
(e.g., tweets and blogs), Judge Hand’s reasoning enjoys continuing vitality 
and respect. 
B.  Benefits of a Specialized Court 
Two other decisions authored by Judge Learned Hand are striking for 
their foreshadowing of a debate that continues to this day:  the 
appropriateness of having technical patent disputes resolved by lay judges 
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and juries.  Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.367 was the central 
precedent for patentability of DNA sequences for over 100 years before the 
Supreme Court reversed course in 2013.368  Displaying unwarranted 
humility, Judge Hand lamented the “extraordinary condition of the law 
which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the 
rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these.”369  Mirroring 
the arguments of current proponents for specialized patent courts, Judge 
Hand pointed to the approach of German courts, in which then, as now, the 
court of first instance in patent cases is comprised of a panel of specialized 
judges who may further call upon technical experts to advise the court.370 
Forty years later, Judge Hand, at that time on the Second Circuit, reprised 
that concern in Reiner v. I. Leon Co.371  Reiner addressed the so-called 
“sign posts”372 that are useful in determining whether a patent is obvious, 
which were later referenced in Graham v. John Deere Co.,373 as “legal 
inferences or subtests [that] focus attention on economic and motivational 
rather than technical issues and are, therefore, more susceptible of judicial 
treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in patent 
litigation.”374  Posited in part as a safeguard against the “ignorance” of the 
judicial fact finder, Judge Hand’s “sign posts”—now more commonly 
referred to as “secondary considerations” or “objective indicia”—have 
stood the test of time and remain a central precept of analyzing patent 
obviousness defenses. 
C.  Determining a Reasonable Royalty 
There is arguably no more prolific citation in patent litigation than 
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc.,375 cited 
over 500 times in cases and secondary sources.  Ask any patent litigator 
what the “Georgia-Pacific factors” are and the lawyer will recite a litany of 
elements to be considered in assessing what constitutes a “reasonable 
royalty” to compensate for patent infringement. 
While the oft-quoted factors were actually enumerated in the district 
court’s decision in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,376 the 
Second Circuit’s treatment of that decision on appeal, authored by Judge 
Wilfred Feinberg, is notable for several reasons.  First and foremost, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s methodology in assessing the 
appropriate royalty amount,377 absent which it is doubtful whether Georgia-
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Pacific would have become the leading authority that it remains.  Second, 
the court’s conclusion that evidence postdating the hypothetical royalty 
negotiation date is entitled to diminished weight378 remains the law of the 
land today, albeit one that is subject to heated debate.  Third and finally, the 
ubiquity of the district court’s factors overshadows the fact that the Second 
Circuit found reversible error in the amount of royalty assessed by the 
district court.379 
D.  Forerunner to the eBay Doctrine 
The patent community collectively gasped when the Supreme Court ruled 
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,380 that patentees are not automatically 
entitled to an injunction following the establishment of a valid claim of 
infringement.381  Patent owners continue to grumble that the Supreme Court 
in eBay vitiated the constitutional “exclusive right” that flows from the 
ownership of a patent.382  But over twenty years earlier, the Second Circuit 
foreshadowed the current state of the law in Foster v. American Machine & 
Foundry Co.383  Affirming the district court, the Second Circuit, in an 
opinion by then-District Court Judge Murray I. Gurfein, sitting by 
designation, held that “[a]n injunction to protect a patent against 
infringement, like any other injunction, is an equitable remedy to be 
determined by the circumstances.”384  The decision to uphold denial of 
injunctive relief—and the imposition of a compulsory license—turned on 
the fact that “the [infringer] manufactures a product; the [patentee] does 
not.”385  Thus, revisiting Foster reveals not only that the Supreme Court 
was not breaking new ground with eBay, but also that today’s concern with 
“nonpracticing entities” asserting patents for money alone is by no means a 
new one. 
CONCLUSION 
The different substantive areas covered in this Article are not part of one 
overarching jurisprudence but, rather, are distinct areas with their own 
policies and intricacies, primarily joined together by the common feature 
that the property involved is not tangible.  For this reason, it would be 
difficult to try to draw broad-based conclusions from the cases cited.  We 
do note that while one of the Second Circuit decisions discussed is more 
than 100 years old, and others were decided several decades ago, a number 
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are relatively recent—indeed, in the case of the Capitol Records decision, 
current.  Notwithstanding the demographic changes in America, the Second 
Circuit is well positioned to continue in the coming decades to be a leader 
in the development of U.S. intellectual property law. 
 
